Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science
Volume 35
Number 2 Number 2/3

Article 23

1968

The Future of Coexistence: U.S.-Soviet Relations
Nicolas Protyniak
Roanoke College, Virginia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas
Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Protyniak, N. (1968). The Future of Coexistence: U.S.-Soviet Relations. Journal of the Minnesota Academy
of Science, Vol. 35 No.2, 141-145.
Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas/vol35/iss2/23

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Minnesota Morris Digital
Well. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science by an authorized editor of
University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. For more information, please contact skulann@morris.umn.edu.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Future of Coexistence: U.S.-Soviet Relations
NICOLAS PROTYNIAK

*

ABSTRACT - Basic trends that may develop in American-Soviet relations in the foreseeable future may be analyzed against the background styles of the two countries which constitute a
model of the main determinants in continuity and change. Such analysis seems to indicate that
competition rather than cooperation will continue to mark the relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union, though with a gradual decrease in hostile intensity. Within a broader
view, this relationship may offer to the United Stales not only failures and disappointments, but
also a creative challenge to contribute to world peace and progress if the challenge is realized
and met without the skeptic tendency and mood of international withdrawal that often typified
this country's history.

In analyzing a topic as complex and broad as peaceful
coexistence between the United States and the Soviet
Union, it is imperative to set some guidelines or dimensions under which the subject matter is to be treated. It
is important, also, to isolate some of the more crucial
variables for additional attention.
Certain assumptions must be made about peaceful
coexistence as the basis for further analysis. Within a
broader frame, the two major assumptions may be viewed
as a continuity and change in which the United States and
the Soviet Union maintain their relations. The two assumptions provide, in addition, some broader questions
regarding the extent as well as the limits within which
politics of international relations in general and American-Soviet relations in particular operate.
The extreme difficulty of analyzing American-Soviet
relations within the broad concept of continuity and
change is readily apparent when Soviet foreign relations
are examined within the more basic problems of internal
politics and the traditional Russian patterns inherited
from the tsarist regime. This difficulty is compounded,
also, by the unavailability of some crucial source materials.
Yet much preliminary work on the question of continuity and change has been done by historians and social
scientists, especially since World War II. The prevailing
evidence seems to indicate that both the traditional Russian and the newer Marxist elements are present in the
Soviet political system (Hendel, 1959). Both Marxist
and tsarist Russians were expansive in action and outlook; both tended to be extreme and radical; both were
overly assertive and dogmatic; both possessed messianic
and mystical ideologies; and both considered their ideologies superior to all other ideologies (Lederer, 1962).
These common elements of Communism and Russian
autocracy are largely due to the fact that both operated
under similar conditions. It may explain why the Rus,:, Nicolas Protyniak is assistant professor of political science
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degrees from Roosevelt University, Chicago, Ulinois, and his
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sians were always very difficult to deal with and the
Communists are even more so ( Kennan, 1961 ) .
Contrast of Systems

In relation to the Soviet Union, the United States
stands at the opposite end of the political continuum.
United States political institutions and ideas have evolved
mainly from the 18th century liberalism and within the
unique conditions of the American continent. Social and
p~liti~al institutions have grown from the ground up, culmmatmg finally in the federal system. Such a development has clearly favored individual initiative endurance
self-reliance, and the ability to meet variou~ challenge~
and change. Both traditional authoritarianism and modern totalitarianism are foreign to the American political
system as well as to its liberal and businessman-like tradition. Though gradually, under the modern media of
~ommunication and economic as well as technological
mterdep~nde_nce the gap of contrast is being narrowed,
the crucial differences between the United States and the
Soviet Union are still decisive factors in their relations.
The Communist Terminology

A major obstacle to understanding Soviet policy is the
problem of establishing a true meaning in the Communist terminology. Like so many terms in Soviet poUtics
the phrase " peaceful coexistence" does not imply the'
same meaning as its western counterpart. In a sense,
peaceful coexistence is a misnomer, its basic elements
~eemin~ to connote rather the opposite: political rivalry,
1deolog1cal struggle, class struggle, underground activity,
e_conomic, techno!ogical, social, and scientific competit10n, struggle agamst western imperialism and colonialism, internal and external promotion of Communism
promotion of "wars of liberation," and so on. Coexist~
ence, therefore, does not mean a reconciliation (Spanier,
I 967) between the socialist and capitalist camps. Hence,
the Soviet idea of peaceful coexistence may be paraphrased as a continuation of war by other means.
The ~ew ~olicy, like the previous one, is a strategy
and tactic designed to enable Communism to prevail over
capitalism and other systems. Thus, in actual fact the
conc~pt of peaceful coexistence cannot be regarded as a
genume proposal for peace and is, perhaps, no more gen-
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uine than the decision of the ancient Greeks to abandon
the siege of Troy by a shrewd temporary retreat.
There is, however, one genuine element in the proposal for peaceful coexistence,· namely, the Soviet desire
to refrain from nuclear and major conventional wars, a
decrease in political tension between Europe and the
United States, and the pursuit of less violent, less overt
but more subtle piecemeal expansion.
The only significant change in the new Soviet doctrine
is the abandonment of the idea that war between the
Communist and capitalist camps is inevitable. The Chinese Communists have not given up this ideological dogma, and this is one reason for Sino-Soviet discord. The
Soviets have abandoned war as a means for the achievement of Communism because they realize, as do people
elsewhere, that in a modern nuclear war, which would
harm both sides, the Communists would seem to lose
more since their cause was destined to prevail, and the
capitalists would lose less since their cause was already
doomed.
In the new communist concept of peaceful coexistence,
the element of competition is strongly stressed. In 1959,
Khrushchev told Nixon in Moscow:
Sportsmen have a fine tradition; winners are warmly
greeted and congratulated. Why should not countries engaged in peaceful competition maintain such
a tradition? We will derive profound satisfaction
when we surpass in peaceful competition such a fine
industrial "runner" as the United States, the most
advanced capitalist country (Dept. of State, l 959).
At the June, 1963, Central Committee plenary meeting,
Khrushchev gave this peaceful competition a more eloquent and Darwinist expression a la American style, saying:
The capitalists know the cruel law of competition:
if one outstrips another, the stronger one swallows
the weaker one. The competition of the two systems
in the economic field strikes even greater fear into
the hearts of imperialists. They see that the rapid
growth of socialism is increasingly shaking the foundations of capitalism, bringing the end of this system, which is doomed by history (Barnett, 1965).
Peaceful coexistence, consequently, is only a partial
peace (Ramundo, 1967), and a relatively small part
may be safely considered as such. This was also indicated by the next Communist Party leader, Leonid
Brezhnev, at the 1966 Party Congress. He stated that
"there can be no peaceful coexistence where matters
concern the internal process of the class and national liberation struggle in the capitalist countries or in colonies.
Peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations
between oppressors and oppressed, between colonialists
and the victims of colonial oppression" (Shulman,
1967). The new Communist leadership has not altered
the basic tenets of the coexistence policy which were
formulated under Khrushchev. The change, if any, is
rather noticeable in a more cautious and conservative
application of these principles of peaceful coexistence
(Brezhnev, 1966).
Whatever the changes in the Soviet leadership, one
142

thing remains constant : the challenge to the United
States and its allies in many fields of political and nonpolitical contest. This being the case, the United States
has essentiaUy two alternatives in dealing with the Soviet
Union : either to withdraw from this competitive struggle
to a new position of drifting isolationism or accept the
Soviet challenge and match it with a counter-challenge
within the frame of its tradition. In either case, whatever
America decides will affect not only the two great competing powers but also the rest of the world.
The grave American responsibility in this challenge
is also indicative of the difficulties which the United
States leadership is to face . The question is essentially
one of able leadership which would be equal to the task.
Again, whatever course this country takes, the dilemma
before the American leadership is how to maintain peace
and stability as well as how to provide for necessary and
orderly change in a potentially explosive and revolutionary age.
Path of Least Resistance

Perhaps, no one would more welcome the American
withdrawal from this global contest than the Soviet Union
itself, for that would remove the only serious obstacle
in the Soviet path toward realization of its communist
objectives. Although the Communists are not willing to
risk a war, "they will take advantage of any opening in
any part of the world to expand the influence of Communism" (Harriman, 1967). And though the present
Soviet leadership may be more cautious and less aggressive, it still would be tempted to fill in any possible
vacuum, especially in places where it could easily move
along the path of least resistance.
Since only the United States is capable of meeting the
Soviet challenge, a unilateral withdrawal would entail
grave consequences to the present status quo in Europe
and other parts of the globe. Thus, a unilateral withdrawal poses a serious question: what would the Communists do in their counter-move? It is not too difficult
to imagine why the people in America and elsewhere
would not be willing to submit to the risks of such experimentation. Moreover, for those who make history,
there is also historical responsibility; and no major
power can abdicate its responsibility without being subject to the verdict of history. Certainly, a sense of historical responsibility is also necessary if those who make
history are to be publicly responsible. Recent history of
withdrawals and appeasements to totalitarian-movements-regimes offers instructive comments regarding possible consequences of such policies. Careful considerations, therefore, seem to suggest that a U.S. withdrawal
in the face of the Soviet challenge cannot be an acceptable policy or a solution to the problem.
This leaves the United States only the second option:
to accept the Soviet challenge with maturity and determination and to meet it on Soviet terms. Certainly, a
free and developed society should be capable of meet~
ing a challenge from its less-developed totalitarian competitor. The United States is able to meet the Soviet
proposal for economic competition, disarmament and
arms control, ideological contest and free exchange of
The Minnesota Academy of Science

ideas, exchange of scientific and cultural data as well as
personnel, economic and technical assistance to the developing countries, furthering the cause of national liberation and freedom for all subjugated peopks, promotion
of universal human rights and freedom throughout the
world, promotion of peace through the channels of international organization, and other such projects of mutual interest.
But whatever the competition or cooperation, the
United States should make one thing unequivocally clear
to the Russians: all actions and projects must be reciprocal in their character, and concessions made by one
power must be followed by similar concessions from
another. It should also be made clear to all concerned,
however, that concessions made by one side without a
reciprocal action on the part of another cannot bring
desired results. And one thing that could considerably
mitigate some of the harsher features of totalitarianism
both at home and abroad is the application and systematic pursuance of the idea of reciprocity by a democratic power in its relations with non-democratic powers.
Moreover, the idea of reciprocity could open new fields
for its application as well as a great opportunity for the
American leadership to work peacefully toward improvements and reforms on the world scene. This success is
postulated on the assumption that the policy based on
reciprocity and equality, coupled with wisdom and dignity, is more attractive and efficacious than the Soviet
counterpart (Mosely, 1956).
Above all, projects of mutual interests in the SovietAmerican competition and cooperation must be sufficiently defined and clarified, or set aside until conditions
are ripe for such clarification. In this dangerous nuclear
age, truth and candor must play a far greater role in international relations than ever before. Bluffing, evasion,
misrepresentation, and other such traditional political devices are not only less applicable but more risky in this
context. But a business-like and down-to-earth attitude
in dealing with the Soviets poses some difficulties, for
the Russian mind is less inclined than the American mind
to tread the precise, legalistic, and empirical path in
foreign as well as internal affairs. On the other hand, the
American mind is less favorably disposed to the Soviet
penchant for generalities, inflated and universalized propaganda statements (Goodman, 1960), vague and ambitious pronouncements, inclination to secrecy and conspirative tactic ( Barnett, 1965), cunning as well as duplicity (Hoover, 1958), and other such forms of the Renaissance type of diplomacy.
Moreover, the elimination of less desirable characteristics of diplomacy and clarification of possible doubts
concerning such grave questions as nuclear miscalculation and misunderstanding would further improve the So~
viet-American relations. Furthermore, the Soviet concept
of peaceful coexistence, if it is to be at all meaningful,
would have to be further specified, particularly in cases
of foreign intervention by major powers. How much assistance, for instance, can a major power lend in a local
war before such a war is classed as intervention or aggression? Another important problem of peaceful co-
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existence is the question of escalation in local conflicts.
At what point, for example, would a local conflict be
considered general and, thus, outside the scope of the
"peaceful competition?"
A Guide to Strategy

The Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence does not
provide any answers to such crucial questions, nor does
it constitute any real basis for the assessment and evaluation of the Soviet behavior in international affairs. The
policy seems to serve the Soviet Union rather as a guide
in international strategy and tactic as well as the Soviet
condition for peaceful competition to which the United
States and other western countries have been challenged.
Moreover, through this concept of peaceful coexistence
the Soviets project a new image of the Soviet Union as
a major progressive power striving for peace and social
change (Lederer, 1962). In other respects, however, the
concept of peaceful coexistence is perhaps no less nebulous than the old Russian idea of "Holy Alliance" which
was introduced at the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napolean in 1815. The fact that the Soviets have
failed to develop their concept into a useful method of
conflict-resolution or cooperation indicates that they prefer the vogue of ritualistic and propaganda phraseology
to a workable policy.
Though the ideology and diplomacy may encourage
the Soviets to engage in international aggrandizement,
the compelling factor which tends to dampen their appetites is far more fundamental. The first and foremost
element which dictates a cautious Soviet course in foreign affairs is the danger of nuclear war. This real need
to coexist stems from the awesome destructive capability
and the realization that a general nuclear war would
spare neither the victors nor the vanquished. The real
desire to coexist, consequently, is ultimately the very
threat of human survival. The instinct seems to suggest,
as Professor Toynbee once observed, that men, along
with ants, have a vested interest in survival. Thus, the
stalemate emphasizes that there is in fact no alternative
and that it is better to coexist than not to exist. The
people in the Communist orbit - China excepted - arc
no less aware of this danger than the people in the West.
Hence, it is the realization of the common danger of extermination which provides the most compelling and important reason in the desire to avoid such devastating
wars.
This danger of nuclear holocaust, together with the
fact that the nuclear destructive forces cannot be eliminated, presents the leadership of the major powers with
the problem of working out a pattern for peaceful coexistence along with the nuclear threat Moreover, there
is no possibility to turn back the clock of history and return to more serene, peaceful, and non-nuclear times.
What is at stake is not a question of whether different
political systems should coexist, but rather whether men
can live together without destroying each other and all
that they have accomplished (Osgood , 1962).
There are some encouraging signs, however, that the
situation may not necessarily be as hopeless as it seems.
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One is the gradual transition from bipolarism to polycentrism. New centers of power in Asia and Europe are
beginning to emerge; the old alliances are changing, and
the tense cold war polarization between the Soviet Union
and the United States is receding.
The nuclear proliferation has helped to undermine the
global polarization of the various states of the two hostile
blocs - Communist and anti-Communist- and to cause
other power centers to emerge. This tendency toward
polycentrism (Lerch, 1967) and power diffusion has favored the lesser powers, for it offered them a greater
freedom of initiative not only in their internal politics
but external as well. At the same time, however, it became in the hands of small states a method with which
to check and limit the freedom of the major powers in
their initiative and their choice of action (Osgood,
1962). This position favorable to the lesser powers was
further exploited and expanded by the satellites in order
to free themselves of political dependency. Moreover, the
great powers have themselves realized the limitations in
the nuclear as well as conventional armament and arms
race and the fact that such an increase in military power
does not necessarily bring the desired political results in
corresponding measure. Thus, they have come to the
awareness that the nuclear stalemate may reach a point
of diminished returns.
Politically and militarily, the United States must adjust to this stage of transition which Leon Trotsky once
characterized as "neither peace nor war." The U.S.
should not then anticipate speedy resolution in the EastWest rivalry.
The Soviet propaganda offensive is far less dangerous
and may be met with less efforts or exertion than other
contests. A free society is better equipped to face a totalitarian ideology than any other and should not fear
losing a war of words to Communists. The Communist
ideology is, therefore, not too dangerous if presented for
what it is: a totalitarian means of rationalization and
justification of one-party rule, buttressed by force and
cunning in the pursuit of its goals.
Economic Competition

Of greater importance and interest in this contest between Communism and capitalism is the question of economic development and competition. In this contest the
United States and other western countries have a considerable advantage over the Soviet Union and its satellites: they are more advanced technologically and possess greater industrial potential as well as productive capacity. As such, they are able to exercise a considerable
attraction for the Communist countries, and in all likelihood will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
Not only are the Soviet European satellites entertaining
a growing interest in the West (Brzezinski, 1968), especially the Common Market countries, but the Soviet
Union, itself, also is often compelled to turn to the Western countries for things unavailable in the Communist
bloc.
Of no minor importance in the context of national
and international politics are the dynamic forces of na144

tiona!ism. The strong feeling of group and national
identity as well as the collective pride in historical triumphs and accomplishments will continue to provide
political dynamics for international relations in times to
come.
Moral and material support of selected nationalist
movements by the United States can further help to reduce the Communist threat and improve Soviet-American relations. Gradual and peaceful transition from a totalitarian to a non-totalitarian system of government in
countries under the Soviet influence will perhaps be more
weighty and decisive in East-West relations than any
formal diplomatic proposal for cooperation or coexistence between the two large powers.
Despite the numerous favorable indications, there are
real problems along the path of peaceful change for the
United States. The world is full of economic, ideological,
and nationalist rivalries and many actual and potential
trouble spots. Moreover, many of the nation-states are
simply neither strong enough nor economically viable to
be able to provide for their own national defense and
prosperity. This fact suggests a rather strong need for
mutual cooperation between the states in their common
endeavors. The United States can play a leading role in
helping this development.
Other Pressures on U.S.

The possibility of peaceful reform offers America a
serious challenge in which it can play a dominant role
in this general enterprise of promoting peace, freedom,
and well-being. At the same time, however, the United
States will continue to face serious difficulties in foreign
affairs: Communist expansion and wars of "national liberation," tribal and sectional conflicts, and nationalist
struggles will continue to tax American resources and
imagination. And no single, universal, or all-purpose
panacea can provide answers to these diverse and complex problems. The only certain course for the United
States to follow is to be resolute, firm, reasonable, and
imaginative. Imperialist designs, conquests, or piecemeal
penetration and expansion must be met collectively as
well as contained. Communist expansion and probing
must be frustrated and proven futile if the Communists
are to be discouraged in their designs. A successful
American foreign policy should enable the threatened
countries, with some American support, to do most of
their defense work by themselves.
The role of American leadership is great and challenging but not at all an impossible task. The modern
political trends and conditions show some promising indications. When one considers politics as a line of continuum, with a free government system on the one side
and a totalitarian one on the other, it is evident that essentially there are but these two political systems with
some shades between them. Clearly, it is a political
anomaly to expect about half of humanity to live under
one or another totalitarian system.
Given a chance, the only way the mass of humanity
can move is toward a more liberal and democratic order.
Dynamic forces to achieve this are already under way,
The Minnesota Academy of Science

and these forces are bound to affect not only the countries involved but also the major powers. Moreover, the
movement will create a greater interdependence among
states as well as a greater need for international cooperation either through bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
Within this continuity and change, the question of the
future of American-Soviet relations may vary considerably, but under a wise policy, need not be too gloomy.
A competitive rather than peaceful coexistence will probably continue with a tough, though somewhat modified,
Russian partner. With time and successive changes in
leadership, the Soviet Union will be moving further and
further away from its fanatical and totalitarian founders.
Before such a change can come to full fruition, however, the United States must be able to weather the storm
and steer its course through more dangerous and challenging times in a period of transition and upheaval.
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Learned Societies Around the World
Eastern and Central Europe

Scientific academies similar to those in the Western world existed in all
Eastern and central European countries before the war. A far-reaching reorganization of these academies took place about 13 years ago. The statutes of the
new academies were patterned upon those of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The
academies were given the status of the "supreme scientific authority" in the
countries concerned. They were made responsible for controlling and coordinating
all scientific research in accordance with the requirements of the annual economic
plans. These new functions resulted in a considerable increase in the number of
institutions and in the personnel employed.
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